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In this paper, we look at





of Tajikistan. In Central
Asia, livestock mobility is
crucial for sustainable
pasture management, but
in Gorno-Badakhsan, average livestock ownership is extremely
low. Households must therefore rely on collective herding
practices if they are to exploit remote pastures and avoid
overgrazing. Post-Soviet land legislation permits privatization
with the aim of improving security of tenure for farmers;
however, the same laws also apply to pastures. We consider
whether the recent legislation is likely to promote or prevent
livestock mobility, and assess the potential impact on
collective herding. The effects of the legislation on the ground
were investigated using 2007 field data from 2 sites, looking
particularly at the impact of pasture privatization on collective
users. We describe the extent to which pasture at these sites
is under private, community, or state control, discuss the
implications for sustainable management of this resource,
and make recommendations for Tajik legislators.
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Introduction: Property rights and
pasture management
This paper looks at the relationship between pasture
management and property rights in the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) region of
Tajikistan. A central tenet to the analysis presented here
is the idea that maintenance of livestock mobility (the use
of different seasonal pastures throughout the year) is
essential for good pasture management. The 2 major
factors affecting livestock mobility are the costs of
migration and property rights legislation. In this paper,
we focus on the latter, reviewing the legislation in
Tajikistan and examining how it is likely to affect access
to seasonal pastures, both in theory and in practice.
Secondly, we look at whether this legislation is likely to
affect access to pasture by different livestock ownership
groups, in particular, those owning small herds, which
represent the bulk of households in GBAO.
Livestock mobility allows stocking rates to track
available resources at different seasons and is thus key to
good pasture management in environments that are
temporally and spatially variable (Coughenour 2007). The
literature on Central and Inner Asia strongly suggests that
reduced movement leads to pasture degradation and, in
some cases, reduced livestock productivity, due to a
mismatch between stocking rates and biomass availability
(Sneath 1998; Kanchaev et al 2003; Kerven et al 2006; Wu
Zhizhong and Du Wen 2009). These authors also suggest
that changes in tenure regimemay contribute to a decrease
in mobility. In recent years, there has been a worldwide
trend for state or common property regimes to be replaced
by private ownership. The rationale for this is to increase
individual investment in land and to avoid the degradation
predicted by Hardin (1968) in his ‘‘tragedy of the
commons’’ scenario. However Hardin’s predictions apply
to open-access regimes (where the resource has no defined
boundaries or users). Instead, many of the pastures that
have been subject to privatization were previously
managed as common property by defined groups subject to
internal controls on grazing ranging from weak to robust
(Bromley and Cernea 1989; Ostrom 1990; Quinn et al
2007). Upon privatization, common resources often
become fragmented into discrete parcels. This restricts the
amplitude of annual migratory movements and
undermines the flexibility to change grazing location with
interannual variation in climatic conditions. Tenure rights
are typically secured by households with larger herds, who
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can cover costs of herding individually. This has led to a
loss of areas for communal grazing by smaller stock owners
and a loss in overall livestock mobility (associated with
deterioration in pasture quality) inmany areas of the world
(Rohde et al 2006; Wen Jun Li et al 2007).
In Central Asia, pasture management has moved from
state-managed mobile systems towards de facto common
property regimes and, more recently, to leasing or
privatization. Mobility has contracted due to drops in
animal numbers and the collapse of state subsidies for
migration and water supply. The sector today is
characterized by a large number of small herds used for
subsistence, and a much lower number of large
commercially viable herds. Broadly, the major barrier to
movement amongst small herders is the cost of migration
itself, combined with lack of infrastructure in remote
areas (Kerven et al 2004). However, as livestock numbers
recover, the influence of property rights on movement
will become increasingly important. In Kyrgyzstan,
following the collapse of state farms, pasture continued to
be used by those communities that historically exploited
them, and common herding systems enabled partial use of
remote pastures (Farrington 2005). Introduction of
leasing laws led to a loss of control over some of these
pastures by former users as land was leased to individuals
from outside the area (Undeland 2005).
By comparison, in Kazakhstan, certain seasonal
pastures and key infrastructure such as wells may be
privatized, but only those with large herds can afford the
costs of privatization and of transport associated with
migration. Collective migratory herding systems are rare,
so households with low animal numbers graze them year-
round close to settlements, causing localized degradation
(Kerven et al 2004). In Turkmenistan, access to state
pasture is negotiated with farmer’s associations, enabling
flexibility of movement and relatively high levels of
livestock mobility (Lunch 2003; Behnke et al 2008);
however loss of state support for movement and water
provision has meant that overall mobility has probably
decreased since reform, with associated effects on pasture
quality (Kanchaev et al 2003).
The livestock sector in GBAO
Animal numbers in GBAO fell sharply at the end of the
Soviet period (Figure 1). Although there has been a
recovery since the late 1990s (MSDSP 2004), ownership
remains low, averaging 9 small stock and 2 head of cattle
per household (MSDSP 2009). The consequences of this
are twofold: (1) most households access pastures through
common herding systems (pooling animals from many
households into 1 herd, overseen by a professional
shepherd), and (2) the livestock sector is largely
subsistence oriented (Robinson 2005). Today, winter
fodder is the major factor limiting livestock production,
suggesting that numbers are unlikely to reach levels at
which pastures might be damaged. However, livestock
mobility has also declined (see Box 1 and Figure 2).
Village (winter) pasture and nearby summer pastures are
heavily stocked for long periods, whilst remote summer
pastures are underused (Ludi 2003; Hoeck et al 2005;
Haslinger et al 2007). These studies indicate that
overgrazing is likely on village pastures, but empirical
research measuring the impact of this process is lacking.
Indeed, the most serious degradation may come from
collection of forage plants for fuel (Hoeck et al 2007).
Policy makers will need to balance the economic and
productive interests of larger herders with ecological
sustainability (defined here by mobility) and social equity
FIGURE 1 Trends in livestock numbers in GBAO from 1917 to 2005 (Sources: State Statistics
Committee [2006, 2008, 2009] and Regional Statistics Committee of GBAO [1972, 2003]).
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(access for small livestock holders). Thus, an ideal
property regime for GBAO would first encourage
mobility (or at least not prevent it), and, second, it would
allow for the communal use and management of pastures.
In the next section, we examine the land legislation to see
whether it meets these criteria. Further, we investigate the
implementation of this legislation on the ground in order
to ascertain its actual impact on livestock mobility and
pasture access.
Results
Pasture allocation and the law
According to the Land Code (State Land Committee
2004), all agricultural land in Tajikistan is owned by the
state. The legislation does not differentiate between
arable land and pastures. Pasture is designated as
‘‘farming land’’ and is thus subject to the same legislation
as arable land. The Land Code offers a number of tenure
arrangements to users (Robinson et al 2008): permanent
heritable land use, long-term use, and leasing. All are
negotiated through the decentralized district offices of
the State Land Committee (Tajikzaminsoz) and are
presented in detail in Box 2.
In reality, in GBAO, most households have permanent
heritable rights to land plots as shareholders in so-called
‘‘collective dekhan farms,’’ based on membership of former
sovkhoz or kolkhoz (see Box 2). Until recently, only arable
land was physically allocated to individual households.
Pasture within the boundaries of collective dekhan farms is
also theoretically eligible for distribution to members but
is usually communally managed. This is a response to the
practice of collective herding that makes splitting of
pasture into shares an impractical proposition. Remoter
areas of pasture may be allocated to collective dekhan farms
from state fund lands for ‘‘long term use’’; these areas are
also generally treated as common land (see Box 2).
The law also allows applicants (theoretically any Tajik
citizen) to obtain pasture for permanent exclusive use on a
FIGURE 2 Location of study sites and relevant district names in Gorno-
Badakhshan and Khatlon regions (referred to as Oblasts, the Russian term for
a region).
BOX 1: Livestock movement in GBAO: Contraction of mobility
During the Soviet period, most migrations in the western Pamir were local and vertical, during which most stock
moved up the nearest lateral valley (Ovchinikov 1977). The main migration to GBAO from outside the region was that
between Saghridasht and southern and eastern districts of Khatlon Oblast (see Figure 2). In addition, some sovkhoz
in the western Pamir were allocated summer territory in the Kyrgyz Alai, also entailing very long migrations. Within
GBAO, cross-district migrations included movement of animals from lower Rushan to Darvaz and Murghab districts (all
shown in Figure 2). Animals from lower Shughnan and Shughdara used the large high-altitude pastures in Jelondeh
(on the border of Shughnan and Murghab districts) and Javshangoz, respectively, entailing relatively long migrations,
although district boundaries were not crossed. Upon independence and the collapse of the state farm system,
pastures in other republics became inaccessible, and use of pasture in other districts or oblasts is now subject to
negotiation with district authorities or heads of collective dekhan farms. It is therefore migrations across
administrative boundaries (shown in Figure 2) that have declined the most. Hoeck et al (2005) noted that a primary
reason for overgrazing on near-village pastures is deterioration of transport and infrastructure in distant pastures.
Movement of populations and animals on the high-plateau areas of Murghab district is much more widespread and
complex than in other regions of GBAO, making use not only of altitude differences but also microclimates associated
with slope and exposure. Whilst in the western Pamir only professional shepherds go to the pastures with common
herds of village animals, in Murghab, many households are mobile, and villages empty in the summer as families
leave for the pastures with their yurts. Households with large numbers of animals also move to remote pastures in
autumn, spring, and even in some cases in winter, thus living away from the village for most of the year (Hangartner
2002). Today the remote pastures are used only by the few families holding the largest herds whilst many common
herds remain concentrated around villages in these seasons (Hangartner 2002), a center–periphery phenomenon
which is a repeating feature of Central Asian pastoralism today (Undeland 2005; Kerven et al 2006).
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first-come, first-served basis. Applications may be submitted
for lands allocated to collective dekhan farms under long-
term use agreements or for state fund land. The
theoretical possibility thus exists that pasture could be
privatized or leased by individual applicants, reducing
access by others. For this reason, such cases of
privatization were a major object of investigation for the
present study.
Choice of study sites and methodology
The case study areas consisted of 2 remote pastures of
regional importance used by large numbers of communities
(see Figure 2). Javshangoz was the first part of GBAO to
undergo significant levels of individual privatization.
Saghridasht, a subdistrict of Darvaz district, had amixture of
collective grazing and continued state ownership that was
BOX 2: Application of land-tenure arrangements
Permanent heritable land use
Permanent heritable land use is governed by The Law on Dekhan Farms (State Land Committee of Tajikistan 2009).
Dekhan farms (literally peasant farms) may be established by individuals, families, or by groups (partnerships) based
on shared ownership. In each case, the farm has a head, who holds the land certificate, and shareholding members,
who should hold share documents to a physical plot of land. The head is responsible for reporting and tax collection,
but decisions on reorganization or changes to contracts between members may only be decided at a general meeting.
Members may secede from the dekhan farm without permission of other members, establishing their own individual
or family dekhan farm on their land share, with the same permanent heritable land rights. However, this is an
expensive process.
Individual or family dekhan farms: When applying to establish a dekhan farm, former sovkhoz or kolkhoz workers
may apply for a share of the former entity for which they worked. Areas allocated should be based on norms calculated
from the area of available land and the number of former sovkhoz or kolkhoz members. Other Tajik citizens may apply
for land from the state fund (or various other categories of unutilized land). Existing dekhan farm holders may apply for
additional pasture land, to be allocated according to the number of livestock to be grazed.
Collective dekhan farms: Legally, these are close to the group/partnership form of dekhan farm given in the law, but
they were not specifically foreseen in the legislation, as in fact they consist of the entire former territory of a sovkhoz or
kolkhoz. These structures appeared in response to government targets to restructure all state farming entities by the end
of 2005 and due to the high transaction costs of forming individual and family dekhan farms. The collective dekhan farm
head holds the land certificate for the whole area, but in GBAO, each shareholding household farms individually and should
hold a legal share document for a physical parcel. Legally, the same principles apply to pasture that is permanently
allocated to the former sovkhoz and kolkhoz, but until 2009, in GBAO, this pasture continued to be used in common by all
members. In 2009, the Land Registration and Cadastre System for Sustainable Agricultural Development Project (LRCSP)
facilitated the conversion of a selection of collective dekhan farms to individual dekhan farms with provision of full
certification for each household. The process is ongoing but should improve security of tenure for those households.
According to the law, each member should receive legal title to equal shares of both arable land and the ‘‘permanent use’’
pasture land allocated to the now defunct collective, regardless of the number of animals owned.
Land allocated from the state land fund for long-term use
In some districts, most pasture used by collective dekhan farms is accessed by members under 25 year ‘‘long-term
use’’ agreements made between farm management and the district land committee. Pasture tax is charged per
hectare, but farm management usually gets around this by splitting the overall sum of tax payable so that each
household pays a proportion corresponding to the number of livestock owned. As long as this land is not permanently
allocated to collective dekhan farms, members do not automatically receive a share if the collective is dismantled. In
the meantime, individuals may apply separately to the land committee for a permanent share of this pasture. Some
officials indicated that in order to privatize pasture on long-term use land, an individual must obtain the written
permission of the members of the collective dekhan farm to which that land was formally allocated. However, in
Tajikistan, this is unlikely to constitute an effective guarantee of common user rights. It should be noted that
collective dekhan farms may also apply to have this land transferred from long-term use to permanent use.
Lease of state fund land
Many remote pastures remain unallocated and form part of the state fund. Any party (individual, collective dekhan
farm, or state enterprise) may take out an annual lease for an area of state fund pasture. As mentioned already, such
land may also be privatized and incorporated into dekhan farms by application, at which point it ceases to be available
for lease.
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also unique in GBAO and was chosen to assess the impact of
such a mixture of ownership types on mobility.
Javshangoz is used exclusively by stock from the
Shughdara valley (which runs the length of Roshtkala
district, with lower reaches close to Khorog). Saghridasht
is used both by local livestock and animals from Khatlon
region. In Javshangoz, livestock numbers and tenure
arrangements at all camps were recorded through
interviews with herd owners and shepherds. In
Saghridasht, emphasis was on interviewing key
informants, including heads of the major state or
collective farms using the pasture or their representatives
in the field. In both areas, local officials were interviewed
about land tenure policy and its implementation. Full
methodology is given in Robinson (2007).
Following fieldwork in 2007, there was an acceleration
of land reform in GBAO. In 2009, follow-up interviews
were carried out with staff at the Land Registration and
Cadastre System for Sustainable Agriculture Project and
both district and regional Land Committee officials in
FIGURE 3 Pasture tenure in the Javshangoz Valley. (Source of cadastral information:
Tajikzaminsoz, Dushanbe, 2006. Satellite image: Landsat color composite 8 June 2001,
Projection: UTM Zone 43, Ellipsoid: WGS84)
Key:
C Land used by collective dekhan farms from Sejd, Shoshbovud, Rubot, Nimos, and
Sovietabad under long-term use contracts of 25 years.
P Land incorporated into individual dekhan farms.
CP Land used by collective dekhan farms Shughnon (from Khorog) and Shobdurahmon (from
Tavdem subdistrict, close to Khorog) that is currently in process of privatization.
SF State land fund: rented out on an annual basis, in process of privatization or abandoned.
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GBAO in order to understand the recent developments
and assess their implications for pasture management.
Case study 1: Javshangoz
The uppermost part of the Shughdara valley (far eastern
end of Roshkala district) is shown in Figure 3. Javshangoz
is the area east of Rubot village, used in the Soviet period
by livestock from lower Shughdara, Khorog, Ishkashim
districts, and Javshangoz itself (see Figure 2 for locations).
West of Rubot, most pasture is allocated to collective
dekhan farms under long-term use agreements. However,
in Javshangoz, much of the pasture has been privatized
through individual application. Emerging tenure
arrangements are discussed below.
1. Individual dekhan farms: There are 7 registered individ-
ual dekhan farms in the Javshangoz valley, each of which
has between 4 and 12 member households. They are
usually registered by prominent local figures or
professional shepherds of collective dekhan farms,
whose claim to the pasture is supported by the fact
that they have lived and worked there for many years.
Lastly, 2 groups of households from Javshangoz itself
registered their own dekhan farms through application,
consisting of pasture areas that they use and manage
on a communal basis.
2. Individual dekhan farms under application: Large areas of
land have been factually annexed by individuals or
groups of households as described above, but the legal
proceedings leading to certification are still ongoing.
Here, we refer to applicants for pasture who have not
yet completed the privatization process as ‘‘claimants.’’
3. Renting from individual dekhan farm or claimant: Regis-
tered dekhan farm owners and claimants rent out
pasture to others, usually shepherds grazing common
herds from villages in lower Shughdara. Some provide
shepherding services for the ‘‘owner’s’’ animals, thus
gaining access to pasture for his own animals and those
of his relatives.
4. Annual renting of state fund land: Large areas of state fund
land have not been privatized or allocated to collective
dekhan farms for long-term use. These areas were
allocated to sovkhoz or kolkhoz during the Soviet time,
but, with the decrease in livestock numbers and
introduction of pasture tax, they were ceded back to
the government by successor organizations. Eleven
occupied camps on state fund land were identified for
which users made annual rental agreements through
the district Land Committee. Some herds had multiple
owners from various villages, whilst others belonged to
individual dekhan farms renting extra summer pasture
to supplement that which they had privatized. Large
areas of state fund land remain unused, including the
area around Turumtaikul Lake.
There are several factors suggesting that exclusion is
not a reason for loss of livestock mobility to Javshangoz.
First, for ordinary households in Shughdara, the key agent
through whom pasture may be accessed is the shepherd,
who negotiates with the Land Committee and constitutes
the herd. Those renting pasture may herd animals of 1
village only, or they may constitute a mixed herd from the
animals of anyone demanding access to summer pasture
in the region. Even shepherds hired to herd animals of
large stock owners with their own dekhan farms may take
on extra animals in the summer in addition to those of
the owner. These systems offer pasture access to
households without a formal land claim in Javshangoz.
Second, the number of stock using Javshangoz is now
about half that during the Soviet period, and large areas
of pasture are empty. This does not mean that all who
would like to use Javshangoz pastures have access:
transport, shepherding costs, tax, and deterioration of
pasture dwellings are all deterrents, but exclusion by
privatization does not yet seem to be crucial, at least in
summer. In other seasons, only the animals of dekhan
farmers and claimants stay in Javshangoz, because pasture
and barn space are limited (Figure 4). It is important to
note that nearly all camps on state fund land are summer
ones, whilst most of the crucial winter and autumn camps
are located in areas undergoing varying stages of
privatization. This pattern reflects the relative value of
these resources.
Case study 2: Saghridasht
In Saghridasht, most pasture and arable land are still
controlled by state enterprises (breeding farms that were
exempt from the restructuring process). The users are
listed in the key to Figure 5, which is based on the
cadastral map of 2005. Since that time, the land-tenure
arrangements have become further fragmented.
FIGURE 4 Heavily used winter pasture in Javshangoz. (Photo by
Nodaleb Muzofirshoev)
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The former sovkhoz Saghridasht covered much of the
subdistrict during the Soviet period. It was then split into
2 small collective dekhan farms (Orzu and Kalai Hussein)
and 1 larger state enterprise, Saghridasht. The state
enterprise has maintained long-term land-use rights to
winter pasture in Dangara district of Khatlon Region (see
Figure 2), thus continuing the Soviet-era migration.
Summer pasture is all located within the enterprise
boundaries in Saghridasht itself (contours 1a and 1b in
Figure 5). Camps are allocated to both state and common
herds (belonging to villagers) by the farm administration,
so households living on the territory of the state
enterprise have access to seasonal pastures for their
private animals. In collective dekhan farms Orzu and
Kalai Hussein, all animals belong to member households,
and at the time of the 2007 fieldwork, pasture was
managed as common land. However, due to their small
size, there are few remote summer camps, and some
herds graze close to villages all year-round. No remote
winter pastures are available. Darvaz was the first district
in GBAO where collective dekhan farms were dismantled,
and land certificates are now being distributed to all
households through the LRCSP (see Box 2). Most pasture
available to these collective dekhan farms is located within
their boundaries. As such, it must be distributed in equal
shares to members in the same way as arable land
parcels. However, each household owns different
numbers of animals, livestock are herded in common,
and the pasture is highly heterogeneous both in time and
space. The way in which these contradictions will be
resolved is unclear, as the pasture allocation process is
ongoing.
FIGURE 5 Cadastral map of pasture in Darvaz district between the Pianj and Khingob Rivers.
Key:
1a and 1b: State livestock breeding farm ‘‘Saghridasht,’’ permanent use.
2a and 2b: State livestock breeding farm ‘‘Saghridasht,’’ long-term use.
27: Long-term use for Vakhsh district, now used by state farm Tebalai from
Mominabad.
28: Long-term use for Pianj district.
29a and 29b: Long-term use for Mominabad district, no longer used due to mines.
32a to c: Land belonging to the State Forestry Department.
33a to d: State land fund available for annual lease or privatization through application.
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In addition to farms based in Saghridasht, in the
summer, livestock also come from Khatlon region, in the
south of the country (see Figures 2, 6). Animals come
principally from 3 former sovkhoz (in Mominabad, Vakhsh,
and Pianj districts), which are now registered as state
breeding enterprises. Pasture is accessed through long-
term use agreements negotiated with Darvaz district Land
Committee, although the enterprise from Pianj now makes
annual rental agreements after having lost long-term rights
during several years of nonuse during the 1990s.
Conversely, many former kolkhoz from Khatlon have
become collective dekhan farms and no longer use pasture
in Saghridasht. Low animal numbers, transaction costs of
negotiations for remote pasture in another administrative
district or region, and lack of coordinated herding
organization are all likely to represent barriers to
migration where farms are no longer owned by the state.
Thus, many areas of Saghridasht remain empty, including
northern parts of the area used by Pianj district (contour
28), areas allocated to Mominabad (29a and 2b), and long-
term use areas of Saghridasht State Enterprise. As in
Javshangoz, stock numbers using summer pastures have
dropped by about 50%.
Conclusions and recommendations
This study has confirmed that pasture privatization is
possible in Tajikistan, not only in terms of legislation, but
in practice. Where pasture is accessed on long-term use
land or on state fund land, privatization occurs on a first-
come, first-served basis and there is no provision in the
law formally guaranteeing pasture-use rights to village
herds. Thus, theoretically it may lead to pasture
fragmentation and reduction in access for those with few
animals who herd livestock in common.
For the moment, at the Javshangoz study site, although
much land has been privatized, most collective dekhan
farms retain common access to pasture for long-term use.
Professional shepherds may privatize pasture as
individuals, but they often continue to graze common
herds there. On the other hand, livestock numbers are
increasing; the value of pasture resources and the
pressure to privatize are likely to increase with them
(Behnke 1985).
The other major category of pasture tenure is
‘‘permanent use land,’’ which is within the boundaries of
the collective dekhan farms themselves. As collective farms
are dismantled, this pasture must be allocated to the new
individual dekhan farms that replace them, in equal shares,
regardless of the number of stock owned by recipients. If
these shares were to be physically demarcated, this
process could result in pasture fragmentation and a
reduction in livestock mobility. In addition, most owners
do not have available labor to herd their tiny flocks as
individuals. At present, user communities, the GBAO
Land Committee, and the LRSCP are looking for
FIGURE 6 Livestock from Khatlon Oblast on summer pasture in Saghridasht. (Photo by Sarah Robinson)
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mechanisms through which this pasture may be used
collectively. However, there is no legal framework that
can guarantee rights that are both secure and common to
groups of dekhan farms.
Tajikistan should take active control over the future of
its pasture resources rather than letting their
management become a side effect of legislation that was
designed for arable land reform. Laws should explicitly
recognize common use, remove negative incentives to livestock
mobility, and allow flexibility in grazing patterns.
The way in which pasture tax is levied is crucial in
this respect. A major reason for distributing permanent
pasture to individuals (whether they have stock or not)
is that local officials are responsible for collecting tax
on this land. With the demise of the collective dekhan
farm, they must ensure that they continue to collect the
same total amount of tax from the successor individual
dekhan farms. Tax charged by head of livestock rather
than by hectare would facilitate legal charging for
pasture use by common herds without splitting pasture
into physical shares. Lastly, removing tax on remote
long-term pastures would significantly increase
incentives for their use.
To guarantee access and avoid fragmentation, a system
of permanent and common property rights for pasture
could be put in place using boundaries defined by the
Land Committee and historical precedent, taking into
account ecological variability and seasonal pasture
requirements. Such a system has recently been passed into
law in Kyrgyzstan, where user groups will become legal
entities (known as Pasture User’s Unions). These will
allocate pastures to both common and individually owned
herds on an annual basis, collect fees per head of stock,
and enforce mobility rules. Whether the law provides
commercial herders with the security of tenure they
require remains to be seen, but policy makers in
Tajikistan would do well to observe the implementation
of this legislation in their neighboring country.
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